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Abstract: This paper addresses the problem of data
sharing among multiple parties, without disclosing
the data between the parties. We focus on sharing of
data among parties involved in a data mining task.
We study how to share private or confidential data in
the following scenario: without disclosing their private
data to each other, multiple parties, each having a
private data set, want to collaboratively construct
support vector machines using a linear, polynomial or
sigmoid kernel function. To tackle this problem, we
develop a secure protocol for multiple parties to conduct
the desired computation. The solution is distributed,
i.e., there is no central, trusted party having access
to all the data. Instead, we define a protocol using
homomorphic encryption techniques to exchange the
data while keeping it private. We analyze the protocol
in the context of mistakes and malicious attacks, and
show its robustness against such attacks. All the parties
are treated symmetrically: they all participate in the
encryption and in the computation involved in learning
support vector machines.
Keywords: Privacy, security, support vector machine,
secure multi-party computation.
I. Introduction
In this paper, we address the following problem: mul-
tiple parties are cooperating on a data-rich task. Each
of the parties owns data pertinent to the aspect of the
task addressed by this party. More specifically, the data
consists of instances, each party owns her instances but
all parties have the same attributes. The overall perfor-
mance, or even solvability, of this task depends on the
ability of performing data mining using all the instances
of all the parties. The parties, however, may be unwilling
to release their instances to other parties, due to privacy
or confidentiality of the data. How can we structure in-
formation sharing between the parties so that the data
will be shared for the purpose of data mining, while at
the same time specific instance values will be kept con-
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fidential by the parties to whom they belong? This is
the task addressed in this paper. In the privacy-oriented
data mining this task is known as data mining with hor-
izontally partitioned data (also known as homogeneous
collaboration [15].) Examples of such tasks abound in
business, homeland security, coalition building, medical
research, etc.
The following scenarios illustrate situations in which
this type of collaboration is interesting:(i) Multiple com-
peting supermarkets, each having an extra large set of
data records of its customers’ buying behaviors, want to
conduct data mining on their joint data set for mutual
benefit. Since these companies are competitors in the
market, they do not want to disclose their customers’
information to each other, but they know the results ob-
tained from this collaboration could bring them an ad-
vantage over other competitors. (ii) Success of homeland
security aiming to counter terrorism depends on combi-
nation of strength across different mission areas, effec-
tive international collaboration and information sharing
to support coalition in which different organizations and
nations must share some, but not all, information. In-
formation privacy thus becomes extremely important: all
the parties of the collaboration promise to provide their
private data to the collaboration, but neither of them
wants each other or any other party to learn much about
their private data.
Without privacy concerns, all parties can send their
data to a trusted central place to conduct the mining.
However, in situations with privacy concerns, the parties
may not trust anyone. We call this type of problem the
Privacy-preserving Collaborative Data Mining problem.
As stated above, in this paper we are interested in ho-
mogeneous collaboration where each party has the same
sets of attributes [15] but has different sets of instances.
Data mining includes a number of different tasks,
such as association rule mining, classification, and clus-
tering, etc. This paper studies how to learn support
vector machines. In the last few years, there has been a
surge of interest in Support Vector Machines(SVM)[29,
28]. SVM is a powerful methodology for solving problems
in nonlinear classification, function estimation and den-
sity estimation which has also led to many other recent
developments in kernel based learning methods in gen-
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eral [7, 25, 24]. SVMs have been introduced within the
context of statistical learning theory and structural risk
minimization. As part of the SVM algorithm, one solves
convex optimization problems, typically quadratic pro-
grams. It has been empirically shown that SVMs have
good generalization performance on many applications
such as text categorization [13], face detection [20], and
handwritten character recognition [16]. Based on the ex-
isting SVM learning technologies, we study the problem
of learning Support Vector Machines on private data.
More precisely, the problem is defined as follows: multi-
ple parties want to build support vector machines on a
data set that consists of private data of all the parties,
but none of the parties is willing to disclose her raw data
to each other or any other parties. We develop a secure
protocol, based on homomorphic cryptography and ran-
dom perturbation techniques, to tackle the problem. An
important feature of our approach is its distributed char-
acter, i.e. there is no single, centralized authority that
all parties need to trust. Instead, the computation is dis-
tributed among parties, and its structure and the use of
homomorphic encryption ensures privacy of the data.
The paper is organized as follows: The related work
is discussed in Section 2. We describe the SVMs training
procedure in Section 3. We then present our proposed
secure protocols in Section 4. We give our conclusion in
Section 5.
II. Related Work
II.1 Secure Multi-Party Computation
A Secure Multi-party Computation (SMC) problem
deals with computing any function on any input, in a
distributed network where each participant holds one of
the inputs, while ensuring that no more information is
revealed to a participant in the computation than can be
inferred from that participant’s input and output. The
SMC problem literature was introduced by Yao [31]. It
has been proved that for any polynomial function, there
is a secure multi-party computation solution [12]. The
approach used is as follows: the function F to be com-
puted is firstly represented as a combinatorial circuit,
and then the parties run a short protocol for every gate in
the circuit. Every participant gets corresponding shares
of the input wires and the output wires for every gate.
This approach, though appealing in its generality and
simplicity, is highly impractical for large datasets.
II.2 Privacy-Preserving Data Mining
In early work on privacy-preserving data mining, Lindell
and Pinkas [17] propose a solution to privacy-preserving
classification problem using oblivious transfer protocol,
a powerful tool developed by secure multi-party compu-
tation (SMC) research. The techniques based on SMC
for efficiently dealing with large data sets have been ad-
dressed in [14], where a solution to the association rule
mining problem for the case of two parties was proposed.
Randomization approaches were firstly proposed by
Agrawal and Srikant in [3] to solve privacy-preserving
data mining problem. In addition to perturbation, ag-
gregation of data values [26] provides another alternative
to mask the actual data values. In [1], authors stud-
ied the problem of computing the kth-ranked element.
Dwork and Nissim [9] showed how to learn certain types
of boolean functions from statistical databases in terms
of a measure of probability difference with respect to
probabilistic implication, where data are perturbed with
noise for the release of statistics. In this paper, we focus
on privacy-preserving among the inter-party computa-
tion.
Homomorphic encryption [21], which transforms
multiplication of encrypted plaintexts into the encryp-
tion of the sum of the plaintexts, has recently been used
in secure multi-party computation. For instance, Freed-
men, Nissim and Pinkas [10] applied it for set intersec-
tion. For computing set intersection, unlike [10], [2] and
[27] proposed an approach based on commutative en-
cryption. The work most related to ours is [30], where
Wright and Yang applied homomorphic encryption [21]
to the Bayesian networks induction for the case of two
parties. The work that are closely related ours is [32],
where Zhan et.al. present secure protocols for learning
support vector machine over vertically partitioned data.
In this paper, we develop a secure protocol, based on
homomorphic encryption and random perturbation tech-
niques, for multiple parties to build SVMs over horizon-
tally partitioned data without compromising their data
privacy.
III. Learning SVMs On Private Data
Support vector machines were invented by Vapnik [29]
in 1982. The idea consists of mapping the space of input
examples into a high-dimensional feature space, so that
the optimal separating hyperplane built on this space
allow a good generalization capacity. The input exam-
ples become linearly or almost linearly separable in the
high dimensional space through selecting an adequate
mapping [28]. Research on SVMs is extensive since it
was invented. However, to our best knowledge, there is
no effort on learning SVMs on private data. In this pa-
per, our goal is to provide a privacy-preserving algorithm
for multi-parties to collaboratively learn SVMs without
compromising their data privacy.
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III.1 Problem
We consider the scenario where multiple parties P1, P2,
· · · , and Pn, each having a private data set (denoted
by D1, D2, · · · and Dn respectively), want to collabo-
ratively learn SVMs on the concatenation of their data
sets. Because they are concerned about their data pri-
vacy, neither party is willing to disclose its actual data set
to others. Specially, we consider the homogeneous col-
laboration where each data set contains the same number
of attributes but different set of instances. Let m be the
total number of attributes in each data set. Let N be the
total number of instances, N1 is the number of instances
for P1, N2 is the number of instances for P2, · · · , and Nn
is the number of instances for Pn. We further assume
that the class labels are shared but the instance identi-
fiers and actual attribute values are kept confidential.
III.2 Overview of Support Vector Machine
SVM is primarily a two-class classifier for which the op-
timization criterion is the width of the margin between
the different classes. In the linear form, the formula for
output of a SVM is
u = −→w · −→x + b, (1)
where −→w is the normal vector to the hyperplane and −→x is
the input vector. To maximize margin, we need minimize
the following [5]:
min
w,b
1
2
||−→w ||2, (2)
subject to yi(−→w · −→xi + b) ≥ 1,∀i, where −→xi is the ith
training example, and yi is the correct output of the
SVM for the ith training example. The value yi is +1
(resp. −1) for the positive (resp. negative) examples in
a class.
Through introducing Lagrangian multipliers, the
above optimization can be converted into a dual
quadratic optimization problem.
min−→α
Ψ(−→α ) = min
αi,αj
1
2
N∑
i,j=1
αiαjyiyjK(−→xi ,−→xj)−
N∑
i=1
αi, (3)
where αi are the Lagrange multipliers, −→α = α1, α2, · · · ,
αN , subject to inequality constraints: αi ≥ 0,∀i, and
linear equality constraint:
∑N
i=1 yiαi = 0.
By solving the dual optimization problem, one ob-
tains the coefficients αi, i = 1, · · · , N , from which the
normal vector −→w and the threshold b can be derived
[22].
To deal with non-linearly separable data in feature
space, Cortes and Vapnik [6] introduced slack-variables
to relax the hard-margin constraints. The modification
is:
min
1
2
||−→w ||2 +C
N∑
i=1
ξi (4)
subject to yi(−→w · −→xi + b) ≥ 1 − ξi, ∀i, where ξi is slack
variable that allows margin failure and constant C >
0 determines the trade-off between the empirical error
and the complexity term. This leads to dual quadratic
problem involving Eq.[ 3] subject to the constraints C ≥
αi ≥ 0,∀i and
∑N
i=1 yiαi = 0.
To solve the dual quadratic problem, we apply se-
quential minimal optimization [22] which is a very effi-
cient algorithm for training SVMs.
III.3 Sequential Minimal Optimization
Sequential Minimal Optimization (SMO) [22] is a simple
algorithm that can efficiently solve the SVM quadratic
optimization (QO) problem. Instead of directly tackle
the QO problem, it decomposes the overall QO problem
into QO sub-problems based on Osunna’s convergence
theorem [20]. At each step, SMO chooses two Lagarange
multipliers to jointly optimize, find the optimal values
for these multipliers, and updates the SVM to reflect the
new optimal values.
In order to solve for the two Lagrange multipliers,
SMO firstly computes the constraints on these multipli-
ers and then solves for the constrained minimum. Nor-
mally, the objective function is positive definite, SMO
computes the minimum along the direction of the lin-
ear constraints
∑2
i=1 yiαi = 0 within the boundary
C ≥ αi ≥ 0, i = 1, 2.
αnew2 = α2 + y2(E1 − E2) η, (5)
where Ei = yiαiK(−→xi ,−→x ) − yi is the error on the ith
training example, −→xi is the stored training vector and−→x is the input vector, and η is the second derivative of
Eq.[3] along the direction of the above linear constraints:
η = K(−→x1,−→x1) +K(−→x2,−→x2)− 2K(−→x1,−→x2). (6)
Next step, the constrained minimum is found by clipping
the unconstrained minimum to the ends of the line seg-
ment: αnew,clipped2 is equal to H if α
new
2 ≥ H, is equal to
αnew2 if L < α
new
2 < H, and is equal to α
new,clipped
2 = L
if αnew2 ≤ L. If the target y1 is not equal to the target y2,
L = max(0, α2−α1), H = min(C,C+α2−α1). If the tar-
get y1 is equal to the target y2, L = max(0, α2+α1−C),
H = min(C,α2 + α1).
The value of α1 is computed from the new, clipped,
α2:
αnew1 = α1 + s(α2 − αnew,clipped2 ), (7)
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where s = y1y2.
In the procedure of sequential minimal optimization,
the only step accessing the actual attribute values is the
computation of the kernel function K. Kernel functions
have various forms. Three types of kernel functions are
considered: they are the linear kernel function K = (−→a ·−→
b ), the polynomial kernel function K = ((−→a · −→b ) + θ)d,
where d ∈ N, θ ∈ R are constants, and the sigmoid kernel
function K = tanh((κ(−→a · −→b )) + θ), where κ, θ ∈ R are
constants, for instances −→a and −→b .
To compute these types of kernel functions, one needs
to compute the inner product between two instances. If
the two instances belong to the same party, this party
can compute the inner product by herself; if one instance
(e.g., −→x1) belongs to one party (e.g., P1), and the other in-
stance (e.g., −→x2) belongs to another party (e.g., P2), then
P1 can compute (−→x1 · −→x1) and P2 can compute (−→x2 · −→x2).
However, to compute (−→x1 · −→x2), different parties have to
collaborate. How to conduct this inner product compu-
tation across parties without compromising each party’s
data privacy presents a great challenge. In next section,
secure protocols are developed to tackle this challenge.
IV. Protocols
IV.1 Introducing Homomorphic Encryption
The concept of homomorphic encryption was originally
proposed in [23]. Since then, many such systems have
been proposed [4, 18, 19, 21]. We observe that some
homomorphic encryption schemes, such as [8], are not
robust against chosen plaintext attacks. However, we
base our secure protocols on [21], which is semantically
secure [11].
In our secure protocols, we use additive homomor-
phism offered by [21]. In particular, we utilize the follow-
ing characterizer of the homomorphic encryption func-
tions: e(a1)×e(a2) = e(a1+a2) where e is an encryption
function; a1 and a2 are the data to be encrypted. Be-
cause of the property of associativity, e(a1+a2+ ..+an)
can be computed as e(a1) × e(a2) × · · · × e(an) where
e(ai) 6= 0. That is
d(e(a1 + a2 + · · ·+ an)) = d(e(a1)× e(a2)× · · · × e(an)) (8)
d(e(a1)a2) = d(e(a1a2)) (9)
IV.2 A Secure Protocol
Let’s assume that P1 has an instance vector −→x1 and P2
has an instance vector −→x2. Both vectors havem elements.
We use x1i to denote the ith element in vector −→x1, and
x2i to denote the ith element in vector −→x2. In order to
compute the K(−→x1,−→x2), the key issue is how P1 and P2
compute the inner product between −→x1 and −→x2 without
disclosing them to each other. In our secure protocol, P1
adds a random number to each of her actual data val-
ues, encrypts the masked values, and sends the encrypted
masked terms to P2. By adding the random numbers, P2
is prevented from guessing P1’s actual values based on
encryption patterns. Firstly, one of parties is randomly
chosen as a key generator. For simplicity, let’s assume
P1 is selected as the key generator. P1 generates a cryp-
tographic key pair (d, e) of a semantically-secure homo-
morphic encryption scheme and publishes its public key
e. P1 applies the encryption key to each element of x1
(e.g., e(x1i+ ri)). P2 computes e(−→x1 ·−→x2). He then sends
e(−→x1 · −→x2) to P1 who decrypts it and gets (−→x1 · −→x2).
We describe this more formally as
Protocol 1 INPUT: P1’s input is a vector −→x1 = {x11,
x12, · · · , x1m}, and P2’s input is a vector −→x2 = {x21, x22,
· · · , x2m}. The elements in the input vectors are taken
from the real number domain.
1. P1 performs the following operations:
(a) She computes e(x1i+ri)s (i ∈ [1,m]) and sends
them to P2. ri, known only by P1, is a random
number in real domain.
(b) She computes e(−ri)s (i ∈ [1,m]) and sends
them to P2.
2. P2 performs the following operations:
(a) He computes t1 = e(x11+r1)x21 = e(x11 ·x21+
r1x21), t2 = e(x12+r2)x22 = e(x12 ·x22+r2x22),
· · · , tm = e(x1m)x2m = e(x1m · x2m + rmx2m).
(b) He computes t1×t2×· · ·×tm = e(x11 ·x21+x12 ·
x22+· · ·+x1m·x2m+r1x21+r2x22+· · ·+rmx2m)
= e(−→x1 · −→x2 +
∑m
i=1 rix2i).
(c) He computes e(−ri)x2i = e(−rix2i) for i ∈
[1,m].
(d) He computes e(−→x1 · −→x2 +
∑m
i=1 rix2i) ×
e(−r1x21) × e(−r2x22) × · · · × e(−rmx2m) =
e(−→x1 · −→x2).
We need to show that the above protocol is correct,
and that it preserves the privacy of P1 and P2 as postu-
lated in Sec. 3.1.
Lemma 1 (Correctness). Protocol 1 correctly computes
the inner product (−→x1 · −→x2) against semi-honest parties.
Proof When P2 receives each encrypted element e(x1i+
ri) and e(−ri), he computes
∑m
i=1 e(x1i + ri)
x2i which,
according to Eq.(9), is equal to e(
∑m
i=1 x1i · x2i +∑m
i=1 rix2i) for all i ∈ [1,m]. He then computes e(−→x1·−→x2+
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∑m
i=1 rix2i)×e(−r1x21)×e(−r2x22)×· · ·×e(−rmx2m) =
e(−→x1 · −→x2) according to Eq.(8). After that, he sends it to
P1 who computes d(e(−→x1 · −→x2)) = (−→x1 · −→x2). Therefore,
(−→x1 · −→x2) is correctly computed.
Lemma 2 (Privacy-Preserving). Assuming the parties
follow the protocol, the private data are securely pro-
tected.
Proof There are 2 points we need analyze. (1) Whether
P1 can obtain P2’s private data. There is no information
that P2 sends to P1, thus, P2’s private data cannot be
disclosed to P1. (2) Whether P2 can obtain P1’s private
data. What P2 receives from P1 is encrypted and masked
element of P1’s data. Since P2 has no decryption key
and doesn’t know the random number used by P1, it is
impossible that P2 can obtain P1’s private data.
Lemma 3 (Efficiency). Protocol 1 is efficient from both
computation and communication point of view.
Proof To prove the efficiency, we need conduct com-
plexity analysis of the protocol. The bit-wise commu-
nication cost of this protocol is (2m + 1)α where α is
the number of bits for each transmitted element. The
following contributes to the computational cost: (1) 2m
encryptions; (2) 2m exponentiations; (2) 2m-1 multipli-
cations. Therefore, the protocol is sufficient fast.
V. Conclusion
In this paper, we consider the problem of collaboratively
learning Support Vector Machines on private data. We
develop a secure collaborative protocol based on seman-
tically secure homomorphic encryption scheme. In our
protocol, the parties do not need to send all their data
to a central, trusted party. Instead, we use the homo-
morphic encryption and random perturbation techniques
to conduct the computations across the parties without
compromising their data privacy. As future work, we will
develop secure protocols for the cases where more kernel
functions are applied. We will also apply our technique
to other data mining computations, such as secure col-
laborative clustering.
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